US Memorandums Regarding Submarine Sales (1963)
The following memorandums from 1963 show that South Africa at that time has been interested in purchasing two or three submarines from the US.
401. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa, General. Secret.
Washington, March 16, 1963.
SUBJECT
South African Interest in Purchase of US Submarines
The South African Naval Chief of Staff urgently asked our Naval Attache in Pretoria to ascertain informally whether the US Government would be willing to entertain a request to permit the purchase of two or three modern conventional attack submarines of about 1700 tons, and would provide crew training for key personnel. Our Ambassador notes that our present policy with respect to South Africa, of which they have been advised, permits the sale of military equipment for external defense, and that this request could be given favorable consideration provided submarines were available.
Submarines of this class are understood to cost approximately $40 million each. They would have to come from new construction, and there would be a three-year lead time from acceptance of order to delivery.
There are both benefits and difficulties inherent in this South African request. An affirmative reply to South Africa would aid in maintaining good military relations, this being of evident consequence in the light of the importance to us of various US military facilities and rights in the country, particularly tracking stations for Atlantic Missile Range operations, port facilities, and overflight rights. In the event the Suez Canal is closed to us, the Navy believes South African harbor and dock facilities are virtually irreplaceable. It is doubtful these strategic interests will be materially changed within the period in which the submarines would be delivered to South Africa.
On the other hand, the prospect of growing racial conflict in South Africa and of intensified international condemnation of the South African Government will make significant US arms deliveries to that country increasingly costly to us in political terms. Our efforts to encourage a moderate African approach to the problems of Southern Rhodesia and Portuguese Africa will be made more difficult. Furthermore, if South Africa's international position continues to deteriorate, it is probable that delivery of US submarines in 1966 could have highly unfavorable repercussions abroad and at home.
On balance, however, in terms of our political relations with South Africa and potential benefits to our balance of payments, I believe we should give an affirmative reply to this informal inquiry and be in a position at least to discuss this sale. Military assistance credits should not be made available. It should be noted that the sale may not eventuate, since the UK is also offering similar submarines for mid-1967 delivery, and the UK price may be lower than ours.
I would appreciate your views. /2/
Dean Rusk
/2/ On March 22, Carl Kaysen sent a memorandum to Secretary Rusk that reads: ``The President has reviewed the course of action you propose in your memorandum of March 16 with respect to the sale of submarines to the Union of South Africa. He concurs with your judgment that on balance it is desirable to make such a transaction if it can be made on acceptable terms." (Ibid.)
415. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk /1/
/1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 - 5 S AFR. Secret. Also sent to Secretary of Defense McNamara.
Washington, September 23, 1963.
The President has approved the Secretary of State's recommendation of August 28 /2/ to continue after the end of this year to license the sale of spare parts of C - 130s sold to the South African Government.
/2/ Acting Secretary Ball's August 28 memorandum recommended that the U.S. Government approve requests received after the end of 1963 to license the sale of spare parts for the C - 130's. He noted that the U.S. Government had approved the contract between Lockheed and the South African Government knowing that it contained the clause providing for the supply of spare parts to maintain the aircraft so long as five were in operation (Ibid.)
With respect to possible sale of submarines to South Africa the President has approved recommendation B of the joint State - Defense memorandum of September 16 /3/ but with these specific limitations:
/3/ On September 16, Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara recommended quietly exploring the sale of submarines to South Africa on preliminary basis. (Ibid.)
(a) It should be made clear to the South Africans that any informal discussions held during the balance of this year are to be strictly confidential and involve no implied commitment to sell, and,
(b) The US can make no decision before the end of this year regarding sales and any eventual decision will be taken in the light of circumstances at the time the question is considered, under our policy stated in the UN Security Council in August.
McGeorge Bundy
423. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy /1/
/1/ Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa. Confidential.
Washington, November 19, 1963.
SUBJECT
South African Submarine Sales
You will recall that in September you authorized exploratory technical talks regarding South Africa's interest in a $90 - 130 million purchase of submarines with the clear understanding that the talks would involve no express or implied commitment on the part of the U.S. to sell and that, in any event, no decision would be made before the end of this year. As a result of a first round in South Africa, State and Defense are now considering a South African proposal for another round of exploratory talks here in the near future.
The prospective value of sale, however, is now down to about $38 million due to South Africa's preference for a smaller, cheaper submarine which the Navy got ELCO to design expressly to meet South African needs. South Africa also has indicated interest in some other military purchases, of which the only plausible one seems to be a $ 35 - 40 million air defense system for their Simonstown Naval Base.
You will recall that in the Security Council debate in August we announced termination of all military sales to South Africa by the end of this year but reserved the right of possible future sales where required for ``the common defense." With the South African issue becoming steadily more difficult internationally, we now have two problems:
1. Given its political difficulties and its sharply reduced balance of payments value, should we continue to explore the submarine sale?
2. In order to retrieve some balance of payments value, should we not only continue submarine talks, but also entertain some additional South African requests such as the Simonstown air defense system?
State and Defense now have these questions under review.
WB
Source: US Department of State
